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SCRATCH MY BACK, AND I’LL
SCRATCH YOURS: SCRATCHING THE
SURFACE OF THE DUTY OF CARE IN
CROSS SECTOR COLLABORATIONS –
ARE FOR-PROFITS OBLIGATED TO
ENSURE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF
THEIR PARTNER NONPROFITS?
Christyne J. Vachon, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
“[I]t is continually becoming more evident that values-based
leadership, synergistic generation of social and economic value, and
strategic cross-sector alliances are key ingredients to achieving sustainably
successful business.”1
The cross-sector interactions between Nonprofit and For-profit
institutions create rich opportunities to explore new and varied corporate
dynamism through collaboration on the path to a philanthropic goal (the
“Collaboration”). Each organization offers opportunities to the other
collaborating entity from which to gain. In this way, a Nonprofit can
benefit from collaborating in a cross-sector Collaboration from, among
other things, access to funds,2 resource and time donations, availability of
* Christyne J. Vachon is a private practitioner in For-profit and Nonprofit law. She is a
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, School of Law.
Professor Vachon is a member of the board of several nonprofit organizations and former in-house
counsel for a venture capital company. Professor Vachon wishes to thank the friends and colleagues
with whom she worked, including George Kuney, Joan Heminway, Paula Schaeffer, Jennifer
Hendricks, Sophia Brown, David Osborne, and Holly Lusk for research assistance, and the University
of Tennessee, Knoxville for its support during the research and writing process.
1. James E. Austin & Ezequiel Reficco, Corporate Social Entrepreneurship, 11 INT’L J. NOTFOR-PROFIT L. 86, 90 (2009).
2. Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, “Contemplating Enterprise”: The Business and Legal
Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 67, 73–74 (2003) (stating that entrepreneurial
ventures provide Nonprofits access to a flow of income that is reliable and protect against the feast or
famine of grant and private donation funding).
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new ideas, learning and expertise,3 developing new contacts and business
avenues,4 and broadening the Nonprofit’s market.5 In turn, For-profits may
benefit from the Collaboration by improving good will and respectability
of the corporate image, engendering trust, accessing new learning, creating
new markets,6 and attracting new employees.7 To accomplish effective
implementation and continuation of the Collaboration, both entities should
be aware of the possible corporate governance issues posed by the
Collaboration and the corresponding options for the business. Too
frequently the legal issues, such as corporate governance, are marginalized
by management in favor of the business issues.8 The legalities can affect
the business’ viability and productivity depending on the information
known and decisions made, and therefore, should be an integral part of
management decision making.9
In Part II, this paper will explain the concept of the Collaboration, its
relevance to the Nonprofit and For-profit individually, and the
Collaboration’s path along a continuum of ever increasing levels of
engagement between the Nonprofit and For-profit (“Continuum”). By
examining the Collaboration from the perspective of the Continuum, this
paper will evaluate in Part III the duty of care of the entities’ boards of
directors and related management with similar authority (“Board and
Others”), and its application in the context of the cross-sector dynamic for
the Nonprofit and For-profit. The paper will further explore whether the
duty of care owed to the For-profit implicates a responsibility on the part of
the For-profit’s Board and Others to ensure proper care and sustainability
of the Nonprofit in the Collaboration, especially in light of the fact that
affiliation with the Nonprofit alone can improve the For-profit’s image.

3. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96–97. See also J. Gregory Dees, Philanthropy and
Enterprise: Harnessing the Power of Business and Entrepreneurship For Social Change, SESSION IV:
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, 5 (Aug. 2, 2007, 12:45 PM) http:// www.
brookings.edu/global/aspen/2007dees.pdf.
4. Dees, supra note 3.
5. JAMES E. AUSTIN, THE COLLABORATION CHALLENGE: HOW NONPROFITS AND BUSINESSES
SUCCEED THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 90–92 (2000). See generally Dennis R. Young & Lester M.
Salamon (2002) Commercialization, Social Ventures, & For-Profit Competition, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA (2002).
6. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 96; See Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96. See also
Dees, supra note 3, at 7–8 (discussing the difference between investors and philanthropic entrepreneurs
and the impact they can have on improving social conditions through “supporting social enterprise to
achieve social impact,” “helping social enterprise move into mainstream capital markets,” and
“supporting socially beneficial forms of private enterprise”).
7. See generally Young & Salamon, supra note 5; AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 88, 93. See also
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96 (describing that how a For-profit company that develops a
philanthropic approach can increase their business development and appeal to new employees);
Elizabeth A. Weeks, The Ethical Health Lawyer: Loopholes: Opportunity, Responsibility, or Liability?,
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 320–21 (2007).
8. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70.
9. Id.
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This conclusion will vary depending on where the Collaboration is along
the Continuum.
II. COLLABORATION
The Nonprofit and For-profit are very different types of organizations.
On a very basic level, the cultures of the two types of organizations differ
greatly.10 With the changing business and economic climate, the dynamics
of each type of organization are shifting. With increasing shortage of
funding, Nonprofits are devising means to raise funds which often
resemble those of For-profits, including collaborating with For-profits.11
On the other hand, due to recent corporate scandals and greater
appreciation by the public of the value of the commons, the For-profits are
often incorporating corporate philanthropy into the business plan.12 The
Collaboration has become an integral part of the strategy of these
organizations to increase their value.13 It is not a new idea; Nonprofits and
For-profits have been collaborating for years with increasing frequency.14
In earlier forms, cross sector Collaborations mainly occurred in the areas of
educational reform, cultural opportunities, and environmental concerns in
various communities where the collaborating businesses operated.15
“These alliances are the vehicles for achieving what the [corporate social
entrepreneurship] definition referred to as extending the firm’s domain of
competence and corresponding opportunity set through innovative
leveraging of resources outside its direct control.”16 The Collaboration
between the For-profit and the Nonprofit has been described as occurring
on a continuum, with increasing levels of integration (“Continuum”).17 The
Continuum is useful to understanding the varying levels of involvement the
collaborating entities may engage in and the corresponding duty of care
responsibilities.

10. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 100.
11. Alan R. Andreasen, Profits For Nonprofits: Find a Corporate Partner, HARV. BUS. REV. 47,
48 (1996).
12. Id. at 56 (indicating that a sizeable percentage of consumers stated that when price and quality
of competing products are equal, the consumer considers a corporation’s business practices and a
greater percentage would pay a “premium” on products of companies that support a cause they care
about).
13. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 89.
14. Howard P. Tuckman, Commercialization and For-Profits in Disguise, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CIVIL SOC’Y 504, 504 (2010).
15. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 95.
16. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 89.
17. James Austin, Collaboration Between Nonprofits and Business, 29 HARV. BUS. SCH.
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR QUARTERLY SUPPLEMENT 69, 71 (2000) [hereinafter Austin
Collaboration].
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A. FOR-PROFITS AND THE COLLABORATION
The corporation is a creature of law formed to emphasize one “good”
over others in the interest of the owners of the corporation, the
shareholders. This tradition is often referred to as “shareholder primacy.”18
And the referenced “good” is profit maximization.19 Historically, state
corporate law held that Boards and Others owed a fiduciary duty only to
the shareholders, and therefore, their emphasis was on the profit motive.20
Currently, however, promoters for socially accountable For-profits and
other social entrepreneurs have been effecting change in the thinking, laws,
rules and incentive structures to allow for, and arguably, try to ensure
increased social responsibility of For-profits.21 Some argue that this
approach has not changed the fiduciary duty since, in fact, taking into
account the outside effects of the corporate activities it has the potential to
prop up the bottom line. This still aligns with the traditional duty to the
shareholder.22
In recent years painful examples of greed and corporate power, such
as the Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Madoff scandals, have made the public
and government sensitive to and vigilante of the conduct of For-profits.23
In light of the scandals, new laws, changing business ethics, and increased
scrutiny and/or support from the public and regulators, For-profits find
themselves responding to and developing a new atmosphere with emphasis
on corporate philanthropy, including at times, resorting to Collaborations
with Nonprofits.24 This is true especially in light of the shift in public
appreciation of the commons and the new emphasis placed on corporate

18. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Law Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and
False Fears, ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 87 (1999).
19. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry
into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477, 501 (1995).
20. Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L. J.
401, 401 (1993).
21. DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
TO KNOW 4-5 (2010).
22. Springer, supra note 18, at 88.
23. Weeks, supra note 1, at 320.
24. Id. See Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that corporate social reporting leads to
serious implications and controversy as to the nature of evolving contemporary capitalism. It directly
implies institutional adjustments in the structure and process of the market economy. The import of an
evolving capitalism lends the subject of corporate social reporting a certain public significance); Martha
Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Nonprofit and Profit,
and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2000) (“Examples of profit/Nonprofit
collaborations go far beyond corporate volunteering and financial donations to Nonprofit social
agencies.”); see also HAROLD L. JOHNSON, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE:
SURVEY, EVALUATION, AND PROSPECTS 1, 3 (1979) (discussing corporate accounting, “corporate
reports on social performance beyond that implied in traditional financial data” either for use in the
organization or published externally for varying audiences).
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ethics and governance.25 In general, many perceive For-profits as entering
into Collaborations with Nonprofits so they can “bask in the glow of their
esteemed partners.”26 For-profits may, indeed, seek a Collaboration with a
Nonprofit hoping that the Nonprofit’s image will help to better define the
For-profit’s image, enhance it, or repair it.27 Many For-profits approach the
Collaboration as an opportunity to improve their reputation, and
consequently, their relationships with their customers.28 There are other
collaborative benefits, however, that attract For-profits, such as “creating
an enabling environment, fostering corporate social entrepreneurs,
amplifying corporate purpose and values, generating double value, [and]
building strategic alliances.”29 For-profits may save on advertising and
promotional costs due to the free opportunities that arise from the
Collaboration.30 The For-profit also gains access to a whole new avenue
for potential customers: the Nonprofit’s staff, clients, members, donors,
etc.31 This concept is echoed by Starbuck’s Vice President of Business
Practices, a Collaboration allows the company:
to extend our reach to areas where we have interests, but perhaps
not influence or expertise. It’s a real extension of what we can do,
and often what we would like to do, or what our customers expect
us to do—issues that are very complex and difficult to solve.32

However, the Collaboration may not be easily substantiated by the
Board and Others as a worthwhile use of the For-profit’s resources given
the traditional nature of the For-profit.
B. NONPROFITS AND THE COLLABORATION
A Nonprofit is a business entity created under and governed by state
law, intended for a philanthropic purpose. The tax-exempt Nonprofit
25. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 95.
26. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50.
27. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 56.
28. Id. at 50 (stating that “consumers respond to the halo effect”).
29. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87.
30. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 56.
31. Id.
32. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90 (quoting Susan Mecklenburg, Starbucks Vice President
of Business Practices discussing Starbuck’s partnership with Conservation International to promote
environmentally sustainably production of coffee in Chiapas, Mexico).
This Nonprofit brought to partnership its environmental expertise and its capacity to
work with small farmers. Starbucks contributed its knowledge of quality coffee
production and its marketing channels. This entrepreneurial combination of distinctive
competencies created a process that developed new production techniques and new
supply of organic coffee for Starbucks, which in turn generated significant income
enhancements to the farmers and improved environmental conditions in the growing
areas. This initial partnership expanded to other countries and even led to the
reformulation of Starbuck’s basic coffee procurement criteria and procedures.
Id.
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created under federal law is governed in the United States primarily by the
Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).33 In particular, Section 501 of the
Code provides the primary source for the exemption from taxation.34
Section 501(a) of the Code allows for exemption from federal income tax
for any organization that meets the criteria of Section 501(c) of the Code,
the “charitable exemption.”35 The tax-exempt status of a Nonprofit allows
the organization to be exempt from the obligation to pay certain federal
taxes, such as excise tax and employment taxes.36 Further, this federal
determination relieves the organization of some of the state taxation.
Traditionally, distinguishing itself from For-profits, the Nonprofit
continued its operations by relying on grants from the government and
private foundations, donations from private individuals, and fees for
services.37 This characteristic distinguishes Nonprofits from For-profits.
However, this traditionally clear line between For-profits and Nonprofits
has increasingly become blurred as Nonprofits pursue increased
commercial activity, including Collaborations.38 Principally, there is so
much competition for limited resources in a very challenging economy,
which necessitates the Nonprofit to look for ways to raise funds in
nontraditional ways, a more commercialized approach.39
33. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90 (“Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides
several different categories of organization types for which tax-exempt status is an option.”). See also
Michael W. Peregrine, Legal Concerns in Specific Health Care Delivery Settings: Nonprofit Corporate
Governance, in 3 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE 43:2, 2 (2010) (“Furthermore, the determination of taxexempt status and charitable trust status are not necessarily one and the same. A Nonprofit corporation
is not automatically recognized by virtue of its state incorporation as exempt from income tax under the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Conversely, the lack of tax-exempt status under the IRC will not prevent
the state regulators from concluding that all of the corporation’s assets are held for charitable purposes
(consistent with its charitable dedication clause), notwithstanding a failure to obtain tax exemption.”).
34. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010) and accompanying Treasury Regulations. See PANEL ON
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR
CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS 8 (2007) [hereinafter PANEL]; Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 75.
35. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(a)(c) (West 2010). In addition:
Often tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are referred to as “charitable” organizations.
“Charitable” is actually the term used to describe one of the types of organizations that
qualifies for tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
However, the word “charitable” has become accepted as a more generic term to apply to
“religious,” “scientific,” “educational,” and other similar purposes for which 501(c)
applies.
Christyne J. Vachon, Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care and Loyalty as Nonprofits
Move Into Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. BUS. L. 37, 39 (2011). See also
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 75.
36. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 75.
37. Id. at 68.
38. Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston, The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment:
Introduction: NGOs Between States, Markets and Civil Society, 554 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 8, 11 (1997); Dees, supra note 3, at 1.
39. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 48; Tuckman, supra note 14, at 1 (indicating that a reason there is
a growth in commercial activities by Nonprofits is the serious challenge to raise funds). See also
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 68.
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Commercialization may be the strongest force shaping Nonprofit
business these days.40 Among other things, this step in commercialization
has lead Nonprofits to enter into cross-sector Collaborations with Forprofits at various levels of engagement along the Continuum. Working
with a For-profit, the Nonprofit may seek, among other things, greater
access to funds,41 business contacts, intellectual property, brand
recognition, and education of employees.42 While Nonprofits may be
selling products and services to make money to fund the mission,
commercialization achieves deeper penetration through a Collaboration.43
Nonprofits collaborate with For-profit companies as affiliates and partners,
and even have For-profits as spin-offs and subsidiaries.44 These changes
may be seen as admirable and promising as they may lead to greater
However, the
independence and sustainability for Nonprofits.45
Nonprofit’s activities in the Collaboration and the effect of the
Collaboration on the Nonprofit need to be carefully monitored and
evaluated by the Board and Others depending on where the Collaboration
is on the Continuum.
C. THE CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATION CONTINUUM
The Continuum provides a description of the various stages in which a
Nonprofit and For-profit may collaborate. Each step on the Continuum
lends itself to being categorized in specific stages with specific identifying
characteristics, and each stage along the Continuum relates to increasing
engagement between the Nonprofit and For-profit.46 James Austin in The
Collaboration Challenge has identified the Continuum as having three
specific stages identified below: “[t]he characteristics ascribed to each
stage appear in gradations as a multifaceted relationship evolves
incrementally from one stage into another.”47 The deeper the engagement,
the more important the Collaboration becomes to the collaborating entities,
from “peripheral to strategic” as the resources devoted to the Collaboration
40. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 441.
41. The forms of cross-sector relationship that a Nonprofit considers will all, most likely, be
revenue enhancing. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 69.
42. Id. at 96.
43. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 423.
44. Estelle James, Commercialism and the Mission of Nonprofits, 40 SOC. J. 29, 29 (2003). Also
stating that “Nonprofits and For-profits compete with each other in a number of key industries,
including some cases where For-profits are moving into traditional Nonprofit areas.” Id.
45. Allan Maram, Commentary, Commercialization of the Nonprofit Sector: A Discussion and
Critical Analysis, SOC. & PUB. POLICY REVIEW 1, 1 (2004).
46. As James E. Austin described in The Collaboration Challenge, the cross sector interaction
tends to follow a specific collaboration continuum wherein each stage of the continuum has specific
identifying characteristics. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 20, 34. The three stages in the continuum are
philanthropic stage, transactional stage, and integrative stage. Id.
47. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 35.
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by each entity and risk of loss increase.48 Similarly the value of the
Collaboration to each organization increases from incidental to strategic.49
Importantly, the more a Nonprofit or For-profit has at stake in the
Collaboration, the more the Board and Others should be involved to
effectuate their fiduciary duties.
Considering the cross-sector
Collaboration relationship in the perspective of this Continuum can help to
organize the analysis in light of the duty of care in Collaboration
governance.
1. The Philanthropic Stage
The Continuum identified by James Austin in The Collaboration
Challenge starts with the philanthropic stage which is the stage on the
Continuum that most cross-sector Collaborations achieve.50 In this stage
the For-profit corporation provides a charitable donation, and the Nonprofit
is the recipient.51 Early on, in the Austin philanthropic stage,52 for instance,
each side will benefit modestly53 and potentially have an equally modest
risk. The collaborating entities at this stage of the Continuum are very
reserved in terms of corporate resources allocated to the Collaboration and
interaction between the For-profit and Nonprofit.54 This may be called the
“Delivery and Receipt Form.” The For-profit corporation delivers goods or
services received by the Nonprofit, and the Nonprofit, by the association,
delivers reputation to be received by the For-profit.55 Nevertheless, often
with these Collaborations at the philanthropic stage the Board and Others
are not involved.56 “Such low-level engagements between Nonprofits and
companies are commonplace and often long standing, their mutual benefits
real and not insignificant.”57
2. The Transactional Stage
The next stage on the Continuum is the transactional stage in which
“organizations carry out their resource exchanges through specific
48. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 34.
49. Id.
50. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 20.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 87 (stating “The Nonprofit increases funding; the company enhances its reputation as a
community supporter.”) (alteration in original).
54. Id. at 21–22 (stating “Few individuals and none of the top leadership were involved.”
Describing the simple “benefit equation” between City Year and Timberland at the outset of their
collaboration, including that “traditional mind-sets constrained the relationship”).
55. This Delivery and Receipt Form may involve other players as well, such as a provider of
transport and the government, if regulations apply.
56. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 21–22.
57. Id. at 22.
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activities, such as cause-related marketing, event sponsorships, licensing,
and paid service arrangements.”58 In the case of cause-related marketing
and event sponsorship, this type of Collaboration usually represents the
initial form of Collaboration between the entities skipping the philanthropic
stage.59 At the transactional stage, the Collaboration is mutually beneficial
for the parties. The parties seek and identify benefits and, thereby,
establish a two-way benefit flow.60 Each of the entities is more engaged in
the activity of the Collaboration that, generally, leads to increased value to
each organization in the results.61 The For-profit will start to see more
direct benefits to its business operations.62 “Although collaboration in the
transactional stage may focus on the deal between the partners and involve
sharply circumscribed transactions such as those just listed, often it
includes other important resource exchanges as well.”63 This stage
involves the exchange of expertise between the collaborators. “Interaction
between the partners broadens and intensifies. Strategic fit becomes closer.
The complexity of the alliance grows, and the nature and magnitude of the
benefits also multiply.”64 In this stage, it is important for the collaborators
to pursue opportunities that increase the possibilities for each collaborator
to understand the other side’s vision and goals. Through understanding
each other’s vision and goals, each collaborator can realize there might be a
real connection. “The cornerstone for building a richer value exchange is
the identification of overlapping missions and compatible values.”65
3. The Integrative Stage
Characteristics of the integrative stage are when the collaborators’
missions, people and activities benefit from more “collective action and
organizational integration.”66 At this stage, the Collaboration takes on
characteristics that resemble more and more a “highly integrated joint
venture,” and the Collaboration becomes more integral to the strategy and

58. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 22.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 24 (indicating that the Chief Operating Officer at Timberland described this stage of the
collaboration with City Year as “commercial” since “it is analogous to a buyer-seller relationships
dominated by the parties’ search for specific value transactions.”).
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 23 (indicating that this is particularly true when the collaboration has evolved from the
philanthropic stage.). For example “[c]ompany employee volunteer programs often emerge as
extensions of financial donations made to Nonprofits in the philanthropic stage of an alliance, and this
involvement of company personnel begins to generate many of the employee motivational and
developmental benefits . . . .” Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id. at 26.
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functioning of each individual collaborator.67 In this form, the type of
resource exchange intensifies in value and the amount of exchange
increases.68 The interaction between personnel from each collaborator
In the prior stages, the
becomes more frequent and involved.69
Collaboration created value for each collaborator. This continues in the
integrative stage, but also the element of joint-value becomes part of the
mix.70 The Collaboration creates joint-value to the collaborators such that
the value is contingent upon the survival of the Collaboration. “[E]ach
organization’s culture is affected by the other’s; processes and procedures
are instituted to manage the growing complexity of the relationship.
Ultimately, the alliance becomes institutionalized.”71 Along with this stage
and collaboration comes an “ever-widening set of personal and
organizational connections.”72 “Relatively few nonprofits and companies
have advanced to this degree of integration, but those farsighted partners
that have are reaping what they perceive to be significant benefits.”73
III. THE DUTY OF CARE IN COLLABORATION-RELATED
GOVERNANCE
As stated earlier, there are great differences between For-profits and
Nonprofits. It is important to keep in mind the primary mission for each
organization: For-profit businesses are organized and operated for the

67. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 26.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (indicating that the Chief Operating Officer of Timberland described this stage of the
collaboration continuum as “mutual mission relationship” with boundaries). “It’s not them and us. It’s
just we are us and they are them and we are together us, too.” Id. at 26–27.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 27. Describing the Starbucks/CARE collaboration, Austin writes:
[a]s more Starbucks executives and staff became involved in CARE activities and
some CARE staff spent time in Starbucks, the organizations’ values and missions
became more entwined, and joint learning and value creation increased. This is
indicative of a relationship that is moving beyond traditional philanthropy to the
transactional stage of two-way benefit flows and then to the stage of organizational
integration, in which people from each organization become more deeply engaged in
issues critical to the other.
Id. at 31. “The benefits of an integrative relationship are attended by additional challenges. As the
nature of The Nature Conservancy-Georgia- Pacific relationship has changed with its progression along
the Collaboration Continuum, both organizations have had to relinquish increasing amounts of control,
which has posed a threat to each along the way.” Id. at 33 (Explaining that the Georgia-Pacific senior
communications manager stated “There was concern at Georgia-Pacific about locking ourselves into
something that would be bad for shareholders.” Meanwhile the president of The Nature Conservancy
explained “We value our reputation. If we tarnish it in a partnership, we jeopardize our membership
support and our revenues.” As Austin explained, “[a]s the partnership has intensified and the onceseparate reputations of the partners have become more closely aligned, each organization has also had
to give up some degree of control over its image and brand.”).
73. Id. at 26.
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pursuit of profit and gains to the shareholders, the Nonprofits are organized
and operated in pursuit of its philanthropic mission.74 Despite these
differences, however, there are parallels, including the responsibilities of
each organization’s Board and Others to ensure the proper care of the
organization.75 In general, in recent years with several instances of Forprofit and Nonprofit corporate malfeasance drawing the attention of the
public and regulators, the duties of the Board and Others have received
heightened attention.76 In particular, governments adopted significantly
more onerous governance requirements and brought more enforcement
actions to thwart the perceived improper, if not illegal, behavior of business
management.77
Responsibility for governance rests with the Board and Others, those
with the fiduciary duty.78 The corresponding duties require that an
organization establish rules, systems, and business practices that ensure the
transparency, accountability and fairness of the entity’s business dealings.79
The Board of both types of organizations is charged with responsibility for
management of the organization.80 As such, they should be guided by the
similar basic fiduciary principles of the duties of loyalty and care.81 The
duty of care on a basic level requires the person with the duty to act in an
“informed and deliberate manner”82 as an “ordinarily prudent person”
74. Vachon, supra note 35, at 37.
75. Some state statues provide limited liability for officers, directors, and other persons serving
nonprofit entities without compensation. See e.g., 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/108.70 (2010).
76. Chris Cornforth, Introduction: The Changing Context of Governance—Emerging Issues and
Paradoxes, in THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: WHAT DO BOARDS
DO? 1, 4 (Chris Cornforth ed. 2003) [hereinafter Cornforth]. See also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note
2, at 72–73 (“In the meantime, with scandals like the United Way of America and the recent Red Cross
embarrassment in New York City, attention has been focused on nonprofit efficiency and
accountability.”). See Danne L. Johnson, Seeking Meaningful Nonprofit Reform in a Post SarbanesOxley World 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187, 217–18 (2009) (indicating that the For-profit malfeasance
received more attention than Nonprofit malfeasance most likely due to the link between “management
malfeasance and individual harm” and the individual harmed with Nonprofit malfeasance in not the
investor but the beneficiary of the Nonprofit’s mission). But see Karen Donnelly, Good Governance:
Has the IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of
Transparency and Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 165 (2010) (stating “Arguably, the public
responded to the tainted industry of good deeds with more disdain and scrutiny than to the corporate
scandals because of the public trust in the nonprofit sector.”).
77. Cornforth, supra note 76, at 5. See also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 72–73 (“In the
meantime, with scandals like the United Way of America and the recent Red Cross embarrassment in
New York City, attention has been focused on nonprofit efficiency and accountability.”).
78. Vachon, supra note 35, at 45–46.
79. Id.
80. Johnson, supra note 24, at 196–97.
81. Id. “Courts apply the duty of care in cases involving alleged negligence, mismanagement, or
intentional decisions to commit unlawful acts. Cases involving fraud, self-dealing, and conflicts of
interest are covered under the duty of loyalty.” 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF CORP. § 837.60 (2011).
82. Lou R. King & Eileen T. Nugent, Corporate Law Aspects of Acquisitions, in 1 NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS 44–45 (2011). See also FLETCHER, supra
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would.83 The duty of care applies to the decision making and oversight
responsibilities of the directors on the Board.84 In the seminal case about
the duty of care, the Aronson court held “[D]irectors have a duty to inform
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then
act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.”85 The Board
exercises its oversight function by authorizing agents, officers and
employees to perform corporate functions on behalf of the Board.86 As the
Board’s role tends to be more passive, it corresponds more to the duty of
care’s oversight management than regular decision making.87 In order to
ensure that it conducts proper and adequate passive management through
oversight, the directors should verify that 1) the corporate management
team can perform the necessary tasks and responsibility, 2) there are
systems in place through which the Board can monitor and oversee the
performance of the corporate management team, and 3) the Board must
respond to protect the interests of the corporation if there are signs that
corporate management is not fulfilling its responsibilities.88 The necessity
for this evaluation increases the further along the Continuum.
Early on in the Continuum, at the philanthropic stage, as stated earlier,
the Board and Others are not very involved, if at all.89 But as the
Collaboration continues to develop, and depending on the form of
Collaboration, the Board and Others will need to become more involved.90
They will need to evaluate the impact the Collaboration will have on the
company and whether it is in the best interest of the company. This
evaluation differs greatly when considering the primary representation that
the Board and Others performs for each collaborator. For a For-profit, the
traditional approach would be that the Board and Others would represent
the shareholders, individuals invested in financial return. This approach
may be modified to account for stakeholders as well. For a Nonprofit, the
Board and Others do not have shareholders to represent. Instead, the Board

note 81, at § 4.02.
Whether by statute or common law, every state imposes on directors and officers a duty
of care to their corporations. This duty is tempered, however, by judicial reluctance to
second guess the business decisions of corporate management. Courts generally focus
on whether the director took reasonable care to make an informed judgment rather than
on whether the judgment itself was reasonable.
Id. at § 4.02.
83. FLETCHER, supra note 81, at § 1032 (discussing the various standards of conduct and
indicating that the “ordinarily prudent person” standard is the majority).
84. 6 IOWA PRAC. BUS. ORGS. § 28:4 (2010).
85. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
86. IOWA PRAC., supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 20.
90. Id. at 60, 77, 85.
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and Others represent the corporate mission and the stakeholders, including
the public.
As part of the analysis to determine if the duty of care has been
fulfilled along the various stages of the Continuum, the court may need to
analyze the conduct under the business judgment rule. The business
judgment rule is designed to ensure that the Board and Others have plenty
of opportunity to sufficiently exercise their power to manage the business
affairs of the organization pursuant to the powers granted to them under the
relevant statutes.91 The business judgment rule provides protection to the
decision maker and the decision.92 The decision, however, had to have
been made in good faith and with proper care.93 Pursuant to the business
judgment rule, liability will not attach if a decision was made in good faith
and the decision maker was a) disinterested (i.e., no conflicts or selfdealing), b) reasonably informed about the circumstances relevant to the
situation and c) rationally believed the decision to be made in the best
interests of the organization.94 If these standards are met, a court will
generally not question a decision unless clearly made irrationally.95
Essentially, actual business judgment must have been made.96 A director
must perform reasonable diligence in order to be able to exercise business
judgment.97 This includes a director informing himself of “all the material
information reasonably available to [him]” before making the business

91. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
92. Olsen provides as follows:
If the sole issue is whether the director breached the duty of care, the courts defer to the
director’s judgment and generally will not impose liability unless the director clearly did
not analyze and evaluate a proposed action before approving it. The courts employ a
presumption of propriety with respect to director actions. This presumption is sometimes
referred to as the “Business Judgment Rule.” The “Business Judgment Rule” will not
protect a director where there is a conflict of interest, fraud, oppression or corruption.
BRENT A. OLSON ET AL., CAL. BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 2:17 (2010). See also FLETCHER, supra note
81, at § 837.60.
93. JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 187, 197.
94. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 54 (Del. 1989);
Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule and Other Protections for
Conduct of Not-for-Profit Directors, 33 J. HEALTH L. 422, 466 (2000).
95. Aronson, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984) (finding that the rule “is a presumption that in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”); Peregrine &
Schwartz, supra note 94, at 466 (stating that “While the Rule ‘is not easily transposed to the nonprofit
context,’ the drafters of the Revised Model Act, several courts, and a number of observers have all
supported such applications.”).
96. See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (stating that “Application of
the [business judgment] rule of necessity depends upon a showing that informed directors did in fact
make a business judgment authorizing the transaction under review.”).
97. See e.g., Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 408 (1st Dist. 1965); Casey v. Woodruff, 49
NY.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y. 1944).
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decision.98 As a result, the director cannot ignore what is going on with the
organization, including Collaboration activities.99 Accordingly, in order to
find that the business judgment rule does not apply, in some jurisdictions, a
claimant must rebut the presumption that the decision was an informed
decision and establish that the director acted in bad faith.100 In the seminal
case, Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court held that the standard to determine
director’s liability requires a showing of gross negligence under the
business judgment rule.101
Starting immediately, before the philanthropic stage, as the two
different types of organizations search out or engage with potential
Collaboration partners to exercise their duty of care, the Board and Others
must inform themselves and reasonably believe the potential collaborator is
the best fit.102 If management is not involved, as has been suggested in the
philanthropic stage,103 the lack of involvement of management indicates,
among other things, the perceived value to the collaborator as well as the
perceived risk.104 The determination of best fit involves creating a strategy,
a meshing of corporate cultures, and determining if both organizations will
benefit.105 This analysis should be done individually by each organization,
while considering the culture, goals and values of the other organization in
the cross-sector Collaboration. For if the goals and values of the other
organization cannot be met, the Collaboration will not succeed. It is
important, therefore, for each organization to determine whether it will be
able to, in the Collaboration, 1) meet and uphold its goals and values and 2)
meet and uphold the goals and values of the other organization, without
encountering risks it cannot manage. Even at the first step in the
philanthropic stage, the two entities need to consider the form of their
interactions and where they plan to take the interactions as their
Collaboration evolves.106

98. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 872 (citing Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 119).
99. Id.
100. In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 746-48 (Del. Ch. 2006). See also Van
Gorkum, 488 A.2d. at 872; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
101. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
102. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2 at 97.
103. AUSTIN, supra note 5 at 90 and 92.
104. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87 (indicating that the process requires management to
advocate it).
105. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 97.
106. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87 (stating that incorporating concepts like social
responsibility into the business process of a For-profit requires that the top management advocate the
change and starts with a “power vision” and “why it is vital to the organization’s success”); Gary H.
Moore, Joint Ownership of Intellectual Property: Issues and Pitfalls, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING,
AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 215, 220–21 (PLI Corp. Law Practice, Course Handbook
Ser. No. 1132, 199) (stating that if there is collaboratively created intellectual property it should be
considered early on and incorporated into the agreements drafted for the collaborative venture).
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IV. FOR-PROFIT’S DUTY OF CARE
AND THE COLLABORATION
Corporations have grown immensely powerful. Three hundred
multinational corporations control roughly a quarter of the world’s wealth.
Their managers frequently make decisions that run counter to the long-term
interests of the public and even their own shareholders, as the recent
financial crisis has illustrated. Some view these derelictions as an
unavoidable consequence of the corporate legal structure. 107
Integrating the Collaboration into the For-profit’s agenda can be a
great challenge for the Board and Others due to the fact that the traditional
role of a For-profit Board and Others is to represent the shareholders and
ensure profitability of the company, thereby guaranteeing a return on the
shareholders’ investment. Translated, the bottom line for the company
represents the mission of the For-profit company, possibly to the exclusion
of the interests of stakeholders.108 “Stakeholders are those being defined as
groups who are significantly affected by company actions and who can in
turn impact the company.”109 The embodiment of this approach can be
found with Milton Friedman who was quoted as saying that the “social
responsibility of business is to increase profits.”110
When other factors come into play, such as stakeholders and
philanthropy, the waters become clouded111 because, traditionally, business
and philanthropy are separate paths in the For-profit world.112 Concern for
social responsibility on the part of the company might impair the pursuit of

107. DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 4 (2010) (For example, in
this book The Corporation, law professor Joel Bakan argues that while a corporation enjoys the legal
status of a person, it is free of the social and legal forces that ensure good behavior from real people,
such as empathy, public disapproval, and the threat of imprisonment. “Unlike the human beings who
inhabit it,” he writes, “the corporation is singularly self-interested and unable to feel genuine concern
for others in any context.”).
108. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970; Weeks,
supra note 7, at 320. HAROLD L. JOHNSON, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE:
SURVEY, EVALUATION, AND PROSPECTS 9 (1979) (“According to the traditional framework, the
enterprise is concentrated in the role and goals of the entrepreneur who contracts with owners of
various inputs for their services and commodities into a production process. The objective function of
the firm is solely that of the entrepreneur who, particularly in competitive markets, is motivated by a
singled-minded focus on profits. Owners of inputs are said to take up the purpose of the entrepreneur
as part of a contractual quid pro quo, for it is the entrepreneur’s commercial venture, not theirs. If
workers dislike their jobs, if consumers are dissatisfied with the quality or safety of products, or if
consumers are dissatisfied with the quality or safety of products, or if dealers are outraged by arbitrary
treatment—they vote with their feet, departing the relationship in search of greener pastures.”).
109. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90.
110. Friedman, supra note 108.
111. Cornforth, supra note 76, at 7.
112. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 86–87 (indicating that a national U.S. study (Center for
Corporate Citizenship 2004) determined that most for-profits have not been able to integrate corporate
social responsibility into their organizations significantly). Dees, supra note 4, at 9.
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profit maximization, which would arguably be a breach of the duty of care
to the For-profit.113 In this model, the Board and Others serve as agents to
the For-profit, essentially the For-profit’s owners, the shareholders and,
therefore, their duty of care centers on fulfilling the goals of the
shareholders.114
Consequently, the argument is that the Board and Others have a duty
to ensure and pursue profit maximization. This controversy can be seen as
premised on the actual perception of how the For-profit, through its
operations, links with the outside world.115 Those advocating for profit
maximization exclusively, excluding philanthropy, do not generally
recognize that the economic context of the For-profit is necessarily
connected with the social context outside of the organization.116
Traditionally, courts upheld the shareholder’s primacy, and that remains
the majority today.117 In 1919, the court in the leading case of Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co. held that a For-profit “is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”118 Almost forty years later, the
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. court held that charitable giving was not a
waste of corporate assets and that shareholder primacy “ought not to be
permitted . . . to thwart the long-visioned corporate action in recognizing
and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a constituent of our
modern social structure.”119 The A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. decision
applied the business judgment rule to hold that corporate giving was a
“lawful exercise of the corporation’s implied and incidental powers under
common-law principles.”120 Historically, this seems to be the start of the
shareholder versus stakeholder debate. Today, however, shareholder
primacy is still the norm in many jurisdictions,121 but the For-profit
organization may look for ways to be more philanthropic, moving from
purely donating to a deeper involvement, along the Continuum.122

113. Weeks, supra note 7, at 320.
114. But see Cornforth, supra note 76, at 7–8. According to the agency theory of compliance (the
most frequently used theory in corporate governance), management acts for the interests of themselves
rather than the shareholders or mission. Arguably the duty of loyalty and good faith may be implicated
as well.
115. JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 4.
116. “Proponents of the philanthropic use of enterprise point out that social and economic issues are
inextricably intertwined.” Dees, supra note 3, at 3 (indicating that to create sustainable solutions to
social problems people would be wise to use business methods and market-oriented approaches as a
part of their overall approach but not every social problem will respond to market-based solutions or
business methods).
117. Springer, supra note 18, at 87.
118. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich. 1919).
119. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953).
120. Id.
121. Springer, supra note 18, at 97.
122. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96; Minow, supra note 24, at 1066.
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On the other hand, the new atmosphere encourages a modified
approach to business for the For-profits by emphasizing For-profit’s
conduct effects on others over profits.123 Recent years have witnessed
greater and greater integration of social responsibility into the For-profit
business model such that it has become more the norm in business but not
necessarily in law.124 Shifted perspectives of the corporation and modified
law encourage For-profits’ Board and Others to consider stakeholders
when effectuating their fiduciary duties. State constituency statutes have,
to a certain extent, codified these efforts to allow For-profits to pursue
philanthropy.125 Thus, when making business decisions and plans,
management should no longer only consider the bottom-line but also
philanthropy.126
The duty of care standard emphasizes that the Board and Others must
inform themselves and exercise the decision making and oversight
functions over the Collaboration as an “ordinarily prudent person” would at
that stage on the Continuum, recognizing that shareholder and stakeholder
theories compete but may not be preclusive. Making the decision to
engage or stay in the Collaboration, the Board and Others, taking a
conservative approach to exercising their duty of care, would evaluate
whether, in fact, social philanthropy of the Collaboration can build
goodwill for the For-profit and, thereby, contribute to the bottom line when
consumers gravitate towards the more philanthropic organization.127
Through this approach the For-profit organization may hope to increase its
reservoir of goodwill, develop additional business,128 and take ameliorative
123. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 502 (arguing that the laws of the state have severely limited the
corporation to pursue stakeholder interests and philanthropy).
124. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90. See also, Springer supra note 18, at 87.
125. See the constituency statutes of each state such as DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 8, § 122(9) (giving the
Delaware corporation the power to “make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific
or educational purposes….”); see also N.J. STATE. ANN. § 14A:3–4 (2011) (“(1) Any corporation
organized for any purpose under any general or special law of this State, unless otherwise provided in
its certificate of incorporation or by-laws, shall have power, irrespective of corporate benefit, to aid,
singly or in cooperation with other corporations and with natural persons, in the creation or
maintenance of institutions or organizations engaged in community fund, hospital, charitable,
philanthropic, educational, scientific or benevolent activities or patriotic or civic activities conducive to
the betterment of social and economic conditions, and the board may authorize the making of
contributions for those purposes in money, securities, including shares of the corporation, or other
property, in such reasonable amounts as the board may determine; provided, that a contribution shall
not be authorized hereunder if at the time of the contribution or immediately thereafter the done
institution shall own more than 10% of the voting stock of the donor corporation or one of its
subsidiaries. (2) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as directly or indirectly
minimizing or interpreting the rights and powers of corporations, as heretofore existing, with reference
to appropriations, expenditures or contributions of the nature above specified.”).
126. Weeks, supra note 7, at 320–21.
127. Michael N. Glanz, Introduction to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), IN DOING BUSINESS
ABROAD 229, 232 (2009).
128. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96 (referring to the specific example of Ben & Jerry’s
Partnership Program that granted franchises for the sale of ice cream to community-based social
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steps to counter corporate scandal or bad publicity.129 This conservative
approach treats the Collaboration as another effort to increase the bottom
line and to improve on shareholder interest; therefore it supports the
already fundamental duty of care owed to the organization.
Clearly, the decision to allocate resources to the Collaboration has
varying implications at various stages along the Continuum. The more the
Collaboration diverts from the bottom-line pursuits of the For-profit, the
more important the Board and Others are to the actual decision to be
involved in the Collaboration or stay involved. At the philanthropic stage,
where there is “Delivery and Receipt,” the Board and Others may be
justified in taking a more hands off approach. The transactional and
integrative stages, by their nature, trigger the duty of care given the
allocation of resources and potential risk at those stages. Under the first
approach, the Board and Others can more easily justify the Collaboration
because the For-profit’s bottom line is greatly influenced by its public
image and the Collaboration would be intended to improve that image.130
Improved image means the increased chance for more business which in
turn benefits shareholders. Arguably, the Collaboration would be another
method to improve profits similar to what an advertising campaign is
intended to achieve. Engaging in cause-related marketing, for example,
may not even be written off as corporate giving or community relations in
corporate accounting. Instead, it may come right out of the corporation’s
budget for marketing.131
A less conservative approach finds the Collaboration as augmenting
the mission of the corporation from a corporate mission of maximizing
profits and returns to investors, to a mission of optimizing returns to
stakeholders.132 This approach modifies the duty of care by adding the
stakeholder to the mix. The underlying concept asserted by the Board and
Others would be that through the Collaboration the For-profit is serving a
broader constituency which will improve the company’s sustainability.
Through this means, the company would produce both economic and social
value, which some have referred to as “blended value.”133 Arguably, this
second approach is a greater challenge for the Board and Others to validate
as consistent with the duty of care.134 “In this approach organizations’
social value creation is not treated as something separate or peripheral. On

services Nonprofit organizations. Through this process the Nonprofit gains experience and knowledge
on how to run a business and, in turn, Ben & Jerry’s gains advertising.).
129. Minow, supra note 24, at 1066.
130. Id.
131. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 48.
132. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90.
133. Id.
134. The duty of loyalty may also be implicated.
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the contrary, it is imbedded in a larger and transparent accountability
system that reports to the internal and external stakeholders.”135
To help the Board and Others exercise the duty of care, they should
consider: 1) What does the For-profit intend to gain from the
Collaboration? 2) Does the bottom line of the For-profit stand to benefit
from the Collaboration and to what degree? 3) At what point on the
Continuum will the Collaboration start and where do the collaborating
entities intend that it should go? 4) What are the risks to the For-profit of
the Collaboration, which will be influenced by the stage on the Continuum
and the evaluated strength of the collaborating Nonprofit? and 5) Are the
risks of the Collaboration worth the intended result, including whether the
Board and Others determine if there is an obligation to ensure the
sustainability of the Nonprofit in the Collaboration pursuant to Section III.
C. below? Similar to venture philanthropy, corporate philanthropy requires
the For-profit Board and Others to determine “what measures of social
return it is looking for.”136 Generally, there are a few instances when social
and economic returns are correlated, i.e., they are synchronized.137 In many
cases, however, they do not.138 If there is an economic return for the
philanthropic efforts, it is usually not in time. Ethically, as the
Collaboration proceeds along the collaboration Continuum with investment
by both collaborating companies, it is important for the For-profit Board
and Others to determine whether it is collaborating with an exit strategy in
mind or with loyalty to staying in the Collaboration. As early as possible,
the For-profit company should reach this determination for its own
corporate governance purposes, and ethically given the impact of its
decision on the collaborating Nonprofit. This should be translated in the
business plan. If the Board and Others (ultimately the Board) decide to
pursue a social and not an economic return, then loyalty to the program
rather than an exit strategy may be its better focus of time and funds.139
V. NONPROFIT DUTY OF CARE AND THE COLLABORATION
For a Nonprofit, “[t]he biggest challenge is keeping focused on key
goals; developing a strategy for accomplishing them; and generating a set
of tactics, operations, and actions that are aligned with producing them.”140

135. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90.
136. Roger Thompson, The Coming Transformation of Social Enterprise Q&A with: V. Kasturi
Rangan, HARV. BUS. SCH. (2008) (responding to a query about the state of venture philanthropy).
137. Id. at 1.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id.
140. Sean Silverthorne, Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits Q&A with: Herman B. Leonard, HARV.
BUS. SCH. (Oct. 27, 2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5942.html.
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Like their For-profit counterparts, Nonprofits also have experienced a
heightened level of scrutiny for reasons including their move into
commercialism.141 In addition, it has been uncovered recently that many
Nonprofits did not adequately incorporate corporate governance
requirements.142 The governance law applicable to Nonprofits is really
underdeveloped compared to the law of For-profits.143 Recently, the
Internal Revenue Service ( “IRS”) has been among the leaders in Nonprofit
governance reform, relying principally on public disclosure as a tool.144
The IRS’ 2008 position paper concerning governance and, in
particular, the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt Nonprofit, states:
[the IRS does] not require charities to have governance and
management policies [but that it] will review an organization’s
application for exemption and annual information returns to determine
whether the organization has implemented policies relating to
executive compensation, conflicts of interest, investments, fundraising,
documenting governance decisions, document retention and

141. See ABA COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO NONPROFIT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF SARBANES-OXLEY v-vii (2005). See also Heather Gottry,
Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service Organizations & Social Entrepreneurship, 6 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 249–50 (1999) (indicating that scandals such as with Jim Bakker, Pat
Robertson and United Way of America have also contributed to the scrutiny); Lisa A. Runquist &
Michael E. Malamut, The IRS’s New Regulation of Nonprofit Governance,18 BUS. L. TODAY 29, 29
(2009) (“In light of the Enron debacle and parallel scandals in the Nonprofit world, Congress and the
IRS have put Nonprofits, and specifically Nonprofit governance, under the microscope. SarbanesOxley (SOX) instituted federal corporate governance oversight of public companies.”).
142. Richard Wallace, Nonprofit Corporate Governance: Playing the Game by the Rules,
ALICEBOT (Oct. 1, 2002). For example, the Nonprofits maintained many directors in management
positions. Towards this end, a goal of corporate governance for both the Nonprofit and For-profit
companies is to achieve a board of directors that is primarily independent of the company and can guide
the Nonprofit ethically and legally. A director that is also company management is not independent and
represents a source of conflict.
143. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 500
(1981).
144. Runquist, supra note 141, at 30, 33. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GOVERNANCE
AND RELATED TOPICS – 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS. § 4, (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
governance_practices.pdf. Peregrine, supra note 34, at §43:44 (“The Position Paper is structured as a
discussion of six specific governance topics: (i) Mission; (ii) Organizational Documents; (iii)
Governing Body; (iv) Governance and Management Policies; (v) Financial Statements and Form 990
Reporting; and (vi) Transparency. The discussion reflects governance themes from both the several
public speeches of recent months by IRS Commissioner Steven Miller, as well as those from Parts VI
and XI from the new Form 990 for fiscal year 2008. In this way, the Position Paper significantly
updates and expands upon the February 2007 discussion draft of “Good Governance Practices” for
charitable organizations, which has now been withdrawn from the IRS web site.”). See also INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, FORM NO. 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX, (2010),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trge/governance_practices.pdf. If required to file the Form 990, a Nonprofit
Organization will need to file it annually with the IRS. Many states also require an annual filing of the
Form 990 as well. See also Runquist, supra note 141, at 29. (“The resulting IRS foray into corporate
governance is simplistic; neither the form nor the instructions recognize the many problems that may
result from the revised form.”).
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destruction, and whistleblower claims.145

Consequently, the implication is that a properly organized and operated
Nonprofit will have governance policies for management of the
organization.146
Historically, however, state law has primarily regulated Nonprofit
governance.147 In the area of directors and officers duties and
responsibilities in a Nonprofit, state Nonprofit laws have been primarily
modeled off of the state law of For-profits, particularly corporations and
the Model Business Corporation Act.148 As a result, evaluation of the
conduct of the Board and Others of a Nonprofit involves reference to a
standard of fiduciary duties similar to that of a For-profit.149 Since the
Nonprofit and For-profit are not the same type of organization, however,
this analysis would be incomplete without considering specific qualities of
the Nonprofit.150 First, a Nonprofit’s activities are limited to those in
furtherance of its philanthropic mission.151 Second, a Nonprofit, despite its
name, is not precluded from generating a profit, but must apply the profit to
the purpose(s) for which the Nonprofit was organized.152
In the context of Nonprofits’ governance, the court in the 2008 Health
Alliance of Greater Cincinnati case found that a fiduciary is a person that
has a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another.153 This duty is based

145. See GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 144. See also FORM 990, supra note 146.
146. Vachon, supra note 35, at 44.
147. Runquist, supra note 141, at 29.
148. Vachon, supra note 35, at 44. In addition, in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
some states have proposed laws that apply Sarbanes-Oxley-type corporate governance provisions to
Nonprofit Organizations. Id. In terms of state’s general corporations statutes, Delaware law is worthy
of note for a variety of reasons, including that it has a corporations code that is applied to both for-profit
and nonprofit corporations. Id. at 44-45.
149. Peregrine, supra note 33, at § 43:3. (“Litigation is conducted, contracts are executed, and
money is borrowed all in the name of the nonprofit corporation itself, rather than in the name of
individual trustees, just as in the case of business corporations. In addition, adoption by most states of
the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) confirms the application of
traditional corporate law principles to financial investment practices of charitable corporations
(particularly with regard to UPMIFA’s shift away from a ‘legal list’ of approved types of
investments).”). Id.
150. Vachon, supra note 35, at 39.
151. Id. (“In the United States most Nonprofit Organizations of import are corporations. This
mission limitation means that the Nonprofit’s business purpose is limited to activities specifically set
forth in its organizing documentation, namely its charter or Articles of Incorporation.”).
152. Vachon, supra note 35, at 39 (“Corporate earnings in excess of expenses are returned to the
corporation for use in support of the corporate mission.”). “This “private inurement doctrine” in which
the Nonprofit Organization’s net earnings may not inure to the benefit of private parties, is central to
the law governing Nonprofits. It marks a very clear line between Nonprofits and For-profits.” Id.
(citing DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 2–3 (1988)
[hereinafter KURTZ]).
153. Health Alliance of Greater Cincinnati v. Christ Hosp., No. C-070426, 2008 WL 4394738, at *6
(Ohio Ct. App. 2008). See Vachon, supra note 35, at 46 (discussing this case involving a Nonprofit
corporation).
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the person’s efforts for the other and applies to matters related to those
efforts.154 In the case of a Nonprofit in a cross-sector Collaboration, this
duty attaches to the individuals of the Board and Others acting for the
Nonprofit.155 The traditional role of the Board of the Nonprofit is to serve
as the “guardians of the charity’s mission”.156 Consequently, the decision
by a Nonprofit to enter into a Collaboration with a For-profit and the
ongoing involvement in the Collaboration requires careful analysis and
monitoring to ensure: 1) pursuit of the philanthropic mission and 2)
application of the profit towards the mission. This implicates the duty of
care of the Board and Others.157 The following conduct would help
towards fulfilling the duty of care, among others: 1) understand their
fiduciary duties to the organization, 2) continue to be informed about the
duties and the organization in general, 3) do not take things at face value,
instead be skeptical and ask questions, and 4) when making decisions and
applying judgment use complete (undivided) loyalty and care towards the
organization and if impossible disclose the conflict for approval.158
In its 2008 Position Paper on Corporate Governance, the IRS
emphasized the duty of care through its encouragement of “an active and
engaged board” explaining that “it is important to the success of a charity
and to its compliance with applicable law.”159 The duty of care applies in
two identified categories of Nonprofit action: 1) decision making and 2)
“Decision Making” is when the Board, along with
oversight.160
management, makes a specific decision or pursues a specific action.161
“Oversight” is the general responsibility of the Board to oversee the
management of the day-to-day operations of the Nonprofit. While
ultimately the Board’s obligation, oversight is shared with the management
of the Nonprofit.
The decision-making and oversight aspects of the duty of care are
relevant first to the Nonprofit’s decision to enter into the Collaboration
and, second to the ongoing activities of the Nonprofit relevant to the
Collaboration.162 The further along the Continuum, the more involved the
Board and Others should be to effectively carry out their duty.163 The

154. Vachon, supra note 35, at 46.
155. Id.
156. Id. Cornforth supra note 76, at 7–8.
157. Vachon, supra note 35, at 48.
158. See PANEL, supra note 34, at 8 (indicating “they should be familiar with the basic rules and
requirements with which their organization must comply and should secure the necessary legal advice
and assistance to structure appropriate monitoring and oversight mechanisms.”); Peregrine, supra note
34, at § 6.
159. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 145, at § 3.
160. Peregrine, supra note 33, at § 16.
161. Id.
162. Vachon, supra note 36, at 52.
163. Id.
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collaborating Nonprofit’s Board and Others need to be vigilant to ensure
that the commercialization pressures of the Collaboration, and the time and
activities allocated to the Collaboration at any point along the Continuum
do not erode and/or erase the Nonprofit’s mission and values.164 Exposure
to the Collaboration and resulting commercialism may encourage the
Nonprofit’s board and management to bend to the force of popular will
instead of firmly pursuing the mission, whether popular or not.165 Along
the Continuum, the Board and Others needs to consider the risk of the
Collaboration and whether that risk is worth the ultimate financial, and
otherwise, benefit to the Nonprofit.166
To this end, first, when making the decision to enter into the crosssector collaboration with the For-profit, the Nonprofit’s Board and Others
should pursue answers to the following questions, among others, as part of
the decision making: 1) What does the Nonprofit hope to achieve through
the Collaboration? 2) What are the details about the For-profit intended for
the Collaboration? 3) What stage on the Continuum will the Collaboration
start with and are there goals for moving further along the Continuum? 4)
What are the risks of the commercial venture and can the Nonprofit afford
to take those risks, including mission drift and IRS compliance? 5) What is
expected of the Nonprofit for the Collaboration and can the Nonprofit
afford to meet the needs? 6) Does the culture and mission of the Nonprofit
align with that of the Collaboration and the For-profit in the Collaboration?
and 7) What is the Collaboration timeline and can the Nonprofit meet
them?167
Second, the oversight function of the duty of care relates to the ongoing management of the Nonprofit whilst engaging in Collaboration
activities. Oversight requires the directors to make a reasonable inquiry on
an ongoing basis as the Nonprofit pursues the Collaboration, trying to
balance pursuit of the Nonprofit’s mission with the need for more funds, or
the other goals of the Collaboration.168 The Board, ultimately responsible

164. Tuckman, supra note 14, at 2; Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 441. See also James, supra
note 44, at 29 (“So long as the charitable goal of the Nonprofit remains the driving force, such
commercialization has a positive impact on the finances and long term stability of the organization and
the sector.”). But see Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 86.
165. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 441.
166. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70.
167. Id. at 87 (citing four questions identified by Nonprofit consultant and scholar Edward Skloot).
“However, social service Nonprofit organizations vary dramatically both in their objectives and in how
they achieve those objectives in their day-to-day operations. This makes it very difficult to identify one
or more entrepreneurial strategies that are uniformly appropriate.” Id. at 88.
168. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 144. (“Regardless of whether a charity is a
trust, corporation, unincorporated association, or other type of organization, it must have organizational
documents that provide the framework for its governance and management.”). See PANEL, supra note
34, at 10; Tuckman, supra note 14, at 507. If the Nonprofit is also a tax-exempt organization, this
process should also provide a means to ensure that the Nonprofit stays compliant with the IRS
requirements. The Nonprofit will be deemed as operating exclusively for the charitable (tax-exempt)
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for the management of the organization, is also responsible pursuant its
oversight function (and by implication the Board and Others) to avoid, and
adequately respond to instances of mission drift evidenced by or caused by
the mission distortion of the Collaboration.169 They will need to be able to
recognize and distinguish between the pull of Collaboration
commercialization that benefits the Nonprofit’s mission and Collaboration
commercialization that distorts it.170 Distortion would result in mission
drift. Mission drift happens if the activities of the Nonprofit no longer
relate to and/or support substantially the mission of the Nonprofit.171 As
part of the duty of care, the Board needs to be vigilant to ensure that the
pull of the Collaboration does not erode and erase the mission and values
of the Nonprofit.172 Many times mission drift occurs gradually over time
through the activities of the Collaboration and may be intentional or
unintentional.173 “Important to keep in mind, however, is that an activity
that seemingly may be alternative to the purpose of the Nonprofit may

purpose if substantially all of its operations are devoted to the charitable purpose or purposes. I.R.S.
Treas. Reg § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2008). See GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 145. See
also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 78 (“If more than an insubstantial amount of the
[Nonprofit’s] activities are not in furtherance of its exempt purposes, it will not qualify as a charitable
organization defined in Section 501(c)(3).”). See, e.g., Federation Pharmacy Servs. Inc. v. Comm’r, 72
T.C. 687 (1979).
169. PANEL, supra note 34, at 13 (“The board must protect the assets of the organization and
provide oversight to ensure that its financial, human and material resources are used appropriately to
further the organization’s mission.”). See also GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 144, at
§5 (articulating the duty “to ensure that financial resources are used to further charitable purposes and
that the organization’s funds are appropriately accounted for….”); Peregrine, supra note 33, at §§ 1, 8
(indicating that directors are responsible directing and overseeing the management of corporate affairs).
“The core fiduciary duties attributable to such board members; their compliance oversight obligations
(it being such a crucial aspect of health care); the regulators with primary jurisdiction with respect to
the exercise of such duties; the concept of corporate governance ‘best practices’ as applied to the notfor-profit corporation;” “Many mission statements are written in broad, unfocused, and allencompassing terms, making it difficult to tell when the activities of a nonprofit are causing it to drift
away from its intended mission . . . As a result, individual Nonprofits and their boards are largely free
to judge whether an activity is mission appropriate.” Id. at § 2.
170. James, supra note 44, at 29.
171. Cornforth, supra note 76, at 7–8.
172. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 423. See James, supra note 44, at 29 ( “So long as the
charitable goal of the Nonprofit remains the driving force, such commercialization has a positive impact
on the finances and long term stability of the organization and the sector.”); Tuckman, supra note 14, at
506. But see Dees, supra note 3, at 10–11 (“Aligning incentives to assure the creation of intended
social impact. When philanthropists invest in enterprises, they need to be confident that the incentives
inherent in the enterprise are aligned with their intended social impact, or that safeguards are in place
should financial rewards ever threaten to pull the organization away from the desired social impact.”);
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 86.
173. Tuckman, supra note 14, at 506. (“It can be intentional, as when a Nonprofit consciously
decides to redirect its activities in a new direction, when it is influenced to seek a new direction through
government or donor pressure or it may be unintentional, as when thought is not given to the effects of
commercial activity and the organization gradually addresses its output of goods and services to a
different mission over time.”).

VACHON-SCRATCH MY BACK-10-16-11.JJO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2012

CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATIONS

10/30/2011 3:31 PM

25

actually support the mission.”174 Mission drift has to be carefully
monitored for corporate governance purposes and also because it is often
challenging to detect.175 Some claim that one of the biggest challenges
confronting the Nonprofit is mission drift.176 This is particularly relevant
with regards to a Nonprofit that engages in a Collaboration with a Forprofit particularly as they move along the Continuum towards the
Integrative Stage.
Even if the Collaboration is successful, the Nonprofit may still be
putting itself at great risk.177 For instance, a successful venture with much
profit may implicate a possible violation of a tax-exempt Nonprofit’s status
under 501(c)(3).178 At a minimum, succumbing to the pressure from the
Collaboration commercialization pull that distorts the Nonprofit’s mission
could result in the questionable ethical and legal status of a Nonprofit
claiming a mission but not pursuing it. Further, by benefitting from the
status of being a Nonprofit (such as tax breaks for a tax-exempt Nonprofit),
the Nonprofit will be under intense scrutiny to establish how it pursues
commercialization through Collaboration whereby the Nonprofit company
achieves a degree of unfair competition over For-profit companies.179 The
deeper into the Continuum the Collaboration moves, the harder it may be
for the Board and Others manage the mission drift.
As part of the analysis to determine if a Nonprofit Board member or
Others has met his or her duty of care relating to the decision to enter into
the Collaboration at any point along the Continuum or to stay in the
Collaboration, the court may need to analyze the conduct under the
business judgment rule. A Nonprofit decision maker and the good faith
decision will be protected if at the time the decision was made the decision
maker was: 1) disinterested (i.e., no conflicts or self-dealing), 2) reasonably
informed about the circumstances relevant to the Collaboration, and 3)
rationally believed the decision about the Collaboration to be made in the
best interests of the organization.180 As a result, the activities of the
Collaboration, mission pull or mission drift cannot be ignored.181 The
Board and Others, to better ensure the protection of the business judgment
rule, should continually evaluate, among other things: 1) if the
Collaboration aligns with and will not interfere with the mission and goals
of the Nonprofit,182 2) whether there is a market for the product or service
174. Vachon, supra note 35, at 37.
175. Tuckman, supra note 14, at 506.
176. Sean Silverthorne, Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits, Q & A with: Herman B. Leonard,
HARV. BUS. SCH. (2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5942.html.
177. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50.
178. Vachon, supra note 35, at 37.
179. Maram, supra note 45, at 3.
180. Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 94, at 466.
181. Id.
182. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70.
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to be generated by the Collaboration, 3) whether the Nonprofit will have
resources to meet the needs of the Collaboration,183 4) whether the
Collaboration fits with the purpose of the Nonprofit articulated in its
Articles of Incorporation,184 and 5) whether the Collaboration will achieve
the goals for the Nonprofit and not scar the Nonprofit with prohibitive
risk, including the risk of a tax-exempt Nonprofit losing its tax-exempt
status.185 To monitor for mission drift during the Collaboration, the Board
and Others should consider as part of their oversight function, among other
things, setting up a compliance program that monitors for the following
issues.186
The hiring or increased involvement of people in the day to day
function of the organization’s business who become or are already
driven by personal gain and, therefore, spend the majority of their
time on For-profit activities and begin to neglect or completely lose
the mission of philanthropy that, by and large, does not generate
profit. Similarly, the people in the day-to-day business of the
Nonprofit start to reallocate their work pursuits towards the
commercial activities and away from the philanthropic activities that
support the mission. The commercial venture may cause increased
pressure on Nonprofits to neglect certain aspects of the Nonprofits
philanthropic activities that support the mission. There may be
conflicts of interest between the mission of the Nonprofit and the
intent of the commercial activities. For instance, money may be
raised in the philanthropic, non-commercial activities but end up
being channeled towards the betterment of For-profit activities or
actually bailing out failed commercial projects, including a crosssector Collaboration. These concepts are symptomatic but not
necessarily conclusive.187

Essential to ensuring that these processes are effective, the Board and
Others need to create and implement a strategy and system to accomplish

183. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70.
184. If the Articles articulate an exclusively narrowly defined purpose or purposes, then that may
preclude the organization from functioning in a commercial venture even if for an insubstantial amount.
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 77. “To that end, the Articles of a social service nonprofit
organization seeking exemption from federal income tax should contain a statement of purpose that
reflects the charitable purposes identified in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Additionally, the Articles
must obligate the organization to further such exempt purposes as its primary activity and prohibit the
organization from engaging in any meaningful way in activities that are not in furtherance of some
exempt purpose.” Id. at 77–78.
185. Id. at 70.
186. See Runquist, supra note 141, at 31 (stating that while the IRS Code does not require these
types of policies and procedures, the implication from Form 990 is that a well-run Nonprofit would
have the policies and procedures such as conflicts of interest policy, whistle-blower policy, record
retention and destruction policy, compensation policy, joint venture policy (which is relevant to joint
ventures with For-profit partners), Form 990 disclosure policy, governance disclosure policy etc.).
187. Vachon, supra note 35, at 59.
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the mission and goals in light of the Collaboration. The Caremark court
determined that in certain circumstances, a director’s failure to reasonably
oversee the implementation and continued application of this system could
be a breach of the director’s duty of care.188
In the realm of Collaboration with a For-profit, a Nonprofit’s board
must carefully consider the legality and ethics of the Nonprofit’s
collaboration and potential commercialization.
In particular, the
Nonprofit’s Board should ensure that the intended goals and operations of
the collaboration align with the Nonprofit’s mission189 and that there is a
means to ensure continued alignment. Further, if involvement in the
collaborative venture drifts from the original path and endangers the
Nonprofit’s mission, and tax-exempt status, there are safety measures in
place to ensure a proper and legal response.190
VI. DUTY OF CARE INTERTWINED?
Here is one of the biggest challenges in philanthropy today—there is
just not enough money. Even if you put together what all the governments
and all the philanthropies in the world spend to help poor and vulnerable
people, the financial resources would not be enough to solve the
fundamental problems. It will take much more—and more will have to
come from private investment capital.191
The next question is whether, pursuant to its duty of care, the Forprofit has an obligation to ensure that the Nonprofit does not experience
mission drift—arguably, yes, the deeper the Collaboration is along the
Continuum. This section sets forth the analysis that may determine
whether the Board and Others of the For-profit should consider the care of
the Nonprofit as part of its oversight function under its duty of care to the
For-profit. A first consideration for this analysis is that movement forward
through the various stages along the Continuum does not happen
automatically. Moreover, a Collaboration, in fact, can fall backwards
188. In re Caremark It’l Inc., Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); Sean Silverthorne,
Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits, Q & A with: Herman B. Leonard, HARV. BUS. SCH. (October 27,
2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/ 5942.html. “The court in dicta in the In re Caremark Int’l, Inc.,
Derivative Litig. matter identified the duty of the director to oversee the organization’s compliance
programs. The Caremark court stated that the duty includes a good faith attempt to assure that (i) a
corporate information and reporting system exists and is adequate based on Board determination; and
(ii) the organization’s information and reporting system is adequate to capture and provide reliable and
appropriate information to the Board concerning organizational compliance with applicable laws in a
timely way and in the ordinary course of business.” Vachon, supra note 34, at 59 (referring to In re
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970). See also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 2006).
189. Dees, supra note 3, at 10.
190. Id.
191. Grants & Grantees, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.rockefeller
foundation.org/grants.
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and/or fail along that Continuum as well. The status on the Continuum is
determined as a result of the collaborating partners’ efforts and activities to
support the Collaboration.192 If the Collaboration venture fails, a For-profit
can usually absorb financial failure more readily than the Nonprofit that
most likely has a small staff and limited resources.193
A second consideration is derived from the application of
psychological theory to the Collaboration. The psychologist Piaget’s
theory about childhood development has been applied to corporations,
Boards, and Others, finding in general that a corporation and its
management will function better and more ethically if less dominated and
constrained.194 The dominant theme from Piaget’s research was that
children will not develop into autonomous and morally responsible adults
without having had the experience of cooperative play and other childhood
ventures with those who are the child’s equals.195 Society in general seems
to be ideally modeled from Piaget’s equilibrium concepts of autonomy,
cooperation and reciprocity (“Ideal Model”).196 Characteristics of this Ideal
Model include “relatively equal and free autonomous beings seeking their
own ends and respecting the ends of others with agreement on the general
principle that each should have the opportunity to do just that and that
governmental restraint is justified only to sustain that possibility.”197 In
today’s society, the corporation is taking on more and more characteristics
of the natural person under the law, and is also comprised of natural
persons that exercise the corporation’s decision-making functions and
general oversight. Given the nature of the Collaboration, with the
Nonprofit usually in need of funds from the For-profit, and maybe in need
of business expertise, it may be argued that the For-profit has greater
potential for treating the Nonprofit as an inferior or a subordinate and
thereby creating the antithesis of the Ideal Model. In this way, under
Piaget’s theory, if a For-profit were to conduct itself in the Collaboration in
this oppressive manner, the Nonprofit’s development in the Collaboration
may suffer, including its moral autonomy thereby implicating mission drift.
Mission drift would lead to varying problems for the Nonprofit, the worst
being failure of the entity and/or violations of IRS regulations.
A third factor is that the failure of one collaborator in the
Collaboration can have negative impacts on the other collaborator with

192. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 35.
193. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50.
194. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 498 (“[T]he relationship between managers and other corporate
constituent groups is characterized by exactly the kind of dominance that Piaget found not only stifles
the moral development of the weaker parties but also leads the strong party to be inattentive to
rationality and justice.”).
195. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 499.
196. Id. at 500.
197. Id.
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increasing intensity the deeper into the Continuum the Collaboration has
moved. A cross-sector collaborator engaging in a Collaboration with a
“tainted partner”198 can have disastrous effects for the collaborator. This
has been true in the circumstances where a Nonprofit collaborates with a
For-profit, and the For-profit’s activities taint the Nonprofit so that even
basic fundraising becomes painfully damaged.199 Similarly, if a For-profit
collaborates with a Nonprofit, and the Nonprofit violates the Internal
Revenue Code or fails entirely as an organization, the For-profit may also
suffer by affiliation. From the For-profit’s point of view, the most valuable
contribution the Nonprofit can make to the Collaboration is its image.200 If
the Nonprofit violated the IRS’ tax-exempt requirements and/or
experienced mission drift due to the pull of mission distortion from the
Collaboration, the For-profit’s image would be damaged.
The relationship between the For-profit and the Nonprofit seeking to
collaborate relates to their engagement with each other. But it also exists
in the historical context, of which some claim that many of the reasons for
the Nonprofit’s existence and the philanthropic considerations of the Forprofit exist due to the problems created by the drive for success of Forprofits as a collective at the expense of stakeholders.201 When a Nonprofit
and For-profit collaborate, it first may be argued that the For-profit has an
ethical obligation to ensure the care and sustainability of the Nonprofit in
the Collaboration due to the nature of its relationship to the For-profit and
the strong pull of mission distortion caused by the For-profit.
The ethical perspective may not suit the nature of the For-profit, but a
second argument is that the Board and Others of a collaborating For-profit
have an obligation to ensure the care and sustainability of the Nonprofit
because their duty of care to the For-profit requires it. This premise
depends on how far the Collaboration is positioned along the Continuum.
The duty of care requires that the For-profit Board and Others be informed.
By being informed, they will understand that the deeper into the
Continuum the more that the success of the Collaboration depends upon the
sustainability of the Nonprofit. The success of the Nonprofit is affected by,
among other things the possibilities of mission drift caused by the mission
distortion pull from the Collaboration. Consequently, the Nonprofit’s
sustainability determines the success of the For-profit’s engagement in the
Collaboration. The success of the Collaboration determines the success of
the business decision by the For-profit to enter into the Collaboration to
achieve its articulated goals, such as image improvements, customer
loyalty, etc. Further, the duty of care requires that they act with “requisite

198.
199.
200.
201.

Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 56.
BORNSTEIN & DAVIS, supra note 21, at 4–6.
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care.” Knowing that the sustainability of the Nonprofit determines the
sustainability of the Collaboration, the For-profit Board and Others
arguably need to determine the level of care owed to ensure the success of
the investment in the Collaboration which may include ensuring the
sustainability of the Nonprofit.202
If, for instance, the For-profit entered into the Collaboration to
improve its image, the image would be damaged if the For-profit were
associated with a Nonprofit that violated laws related to its tax-exempt
status. The chances of failure of the Collaboration can be greatly reduced
by both parties taking steps to ensure the sustainability of the Nonprofit.
Many risks of the Collaboration failing due to sustainability of the
Nonprofit center on the premise that the Nonprofit should be treated not as
charity but as true equal in the Collaboration.203 In the case of the success
of “Charge Against Hunger,” American Express’ Collaboration with the
Nonprofit, Share Our Strength, the money that flooded in as a result of the
Collaboration venture between the two could have overwhelmed Share Our
Strength, such that it would have had more funds and request for use than it
could handle. Instead, American Express anticipated this possible issue,
and established a separate endowment and assisted the Nonprofit to help
establish the necessary procedures and processes to meet the resulting
increased activity from the Collaboration.204 In this way, American
Express struck the balance of ensuring that the Nonprofit did not succumb
to pressures associated with the Collaboration but still participated in the
Collaboration without abusing its tax-exempt status.205
VII. CONCLUSION
New problems create new opportunities for philanthropy. Increased
need has led to increased numbers of Nonprofits, straining the already
limited resources. Increased need, on the other hand, combined with the
changing perspective on corporate value, has created new opportunities for
For-profit organizations to add value, including and most practically
through cross-sector Collaboration with a Nonprofit. There are various
stages on the Continuum at which the collaborators may engage. As the
level of engagement becomes higher, so too does the need for the Board
202. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90 (explaining that at the integrative stage, there is at least
one example where the For-profit held a seat on the Nonprofit partner’s board of directors and had
become engaged in the governance of that partner).
203. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 48. Clearly, the interest in the well-being of the Nonprofit should
not rise to the level as to implicate a conflict of interest or breach of the corresponding duty of loyalty.
Id.
204. Id. at 55. See also Richard Alan Nelson, Ali M. Kanso, & Steven R. Levitt, Integrating Public
Service and Marketing Differentiation: An Analysis of the American Express Corporation’s “Charge
Against Hunger” Promotion Program, in SERV. BUS. 275-93 (SPRINGER-VERLAG 4d ed. 2007).
205. PANEL, supra note 34, at 3.
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and Others to be involved so as to properly exercise their duty of care,
decision making and oversight.
Confronting issues early on and
continually assessing legal considerations such as those identified in this
paper, allows the Collaboration a better opportunity to be stronger and last
longer, with fewer unwelcome surprises for both collaborators. Further,
since the cross-sector Collaborations pose a ripe, new opportunity for both
types of entities to develop as entrepreneurs in a sense, the law in this area
continues to experience parallel changes and enhancements, an exciting
area to explore. As part of the entrepreneurial nature of the business
venture and the law, the collaborators need to be vigilante as to what that
means for the duty of care. In particular, the unique nature of the crosssector Collaboration between a Nonprofit and a For-profit may require that
the For-profit make efforts to ensure the sustainability of the Nonprofit
contrary to the possibility of mission drift and other Collaboration effects.
The risks for negative consequences to the Nonprofit increase the further
along the Continuum if steps are not taken to counter the effects of the
Collaboration to the culture and mission of the Nonprofit.206 This paper
establishes that a For-profit should view the sustainability of the
collaborating Nonprofit as a responsibility under its own duty of care. This
responsibility focuses on the unique influences of the Collaboration on the
Nonprofit and ensuring that the Nonprofit does not abuse the tax-exempt
status and maintains adequate measures in place to continue pursuit of the
mission.

206. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90.
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